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Abstract
We propose a new ensemble method for detecting and classifying adversarial ex-
amples generated by state-of-the-art attacks, including DeepFool and C&W. Our
method works by training the members of an ensemble to have low classification
error on random benign examples while simultaneously minimizing agreement
on examples outside the training distribution. We evaluate on both MNIST and
CIFAR-10, against oblivious and both white- and black-box adversaries.
1 Introduction
As is nowwidely understood, neural networks can easily be fooled by small but cleverly chosen input
perturbations, so-called adversarial examples [10]. We propose a new ensemble learningmethod that
enables detection – in oblivious, black-, and white-box settings – of adversarial examples generated
by state-of-the-art attacks including DeepFool [8], the basic iterative method [6], and C&W [2].
In our method, multiple instances of a base model are trained jointly to minimize a cross-entropy loss.
An additional loss term encourages the models in the ensemble to have highly varying predictions
on examples not from the source data distribution (contrast with [5], which studies ensembles of
distinct defenses). The ensemble labels an input as adversarial when there is little consensus on that
input. Our method is more sensitive than an undefended model to non-adversarial (random) input
perturbations but can detect 68.1% of the adversarial examples generated on CIFAR-10 by C&W [1],
an attack method that was recently shown to be quite effective against existing defenses.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: in Section 2 we describe a simple, computationally
inexpensive, and attack-agnostic ensemble learning method for detecting and classifying adversarial
examples; in Section 3 we experimentally evaluate ensemble classifiers trained using our method
against the adversarial examples generated by the Fast Gradient Sign (FGS) method [4], the Basic
Iterative method [6], DeepFool [8], and C&W [2], on both MNIST and CIFAR-10. The paper
concludes with a summary of the approach and ideas for future work.
2 Ensemble Method for Classification and Adversarial Detection
We propose to train an ensemble of N models that label clean examples accurately while also dis-
agreeing on randomly perturbed examples. At test time, the ensemble will be used for both adver-
sarial detection and classification: the label achieving the maximum agreement on a test example is
output, unless the agreement is too low, in which case the example is labeled as adversarial.
LetWn = [w
k
n]1≤k≤K be the matrix of parameters used by the softmax layer to compute the poste-
rior probabilities corresponding toK classes, and letW = [Wn]1≤n≤N be the 3-dimensional tensor
of the softmax parameters for the entire ensemble. Let σn(x) = softmax(Wn,x) = [σ
k
n(x)]1≤k≤K
be the vector of softmax outputs computed by the ensemble member n on an input examplex. If r(x)
is the representation computed by the layer preceding the softmax, then σkn(x) ∝ exp(w
k
n
T
r(x)).
Furthermore, let x˜ = x + ǫ be the randomly perturbed version of training example x, obtained by
adding perturbation values ǫ that are sampled uniformly at random from [−η, η), where η is a hy-
perparameter that controls the L∞-norm of the perturbation vector. To achieve the dual objective of
high accuracy on clean examples and disagreement on randomly perturbed examples, we define the
cost function J = Je + λJa shown in Equation 1 below, with two components: Je is the standard
cross-entropy error for clean example x and its true label y, averaged over all ensemble members;
Ja is the mean agreement among ensemble members, where agreement between two members is
captured through the dot product of their softmax output vectors.
J(x, y,W ) = Je(x, y,W ) + λJa(x˜,W )
= −
1
N
N∑
n=1
lnσyn(x) + λ
(
N
2
)−1 N∑
n=1
N∑
m=n+1
σn(x˜)
Tσm(x˜) (1)
The hyperparameter λ controls the trade-off between accuracy on clean examples and disagreement
on perturbed examples. For brevity, we omit the weight decay regularization. During training, the
cost function is minimized using minibatch stochastic gradient descent. The cross-entropy term is
calculated as a sum over all clean examples in the minibatch, while the agreement term is calculated
over the perturbed version of the minibatch.
By minimizing both terms simultaneously, the ensemble members are encouraged to label clean
examples accurately while disagreeing on randomly perturbed examples. This is similar in spirit
to a classic technique in ensemble learning known as negative correlation learning [7] in which
a penalty term is used to minimize correlation of incorrect predictions on clean data, except that
here we pay no heed to whether the predictions are right or wrong. Neural networks are often
robust to small random noise, which means that the members may also be penalized for agreeing
on the correct label. This may seem counterintuitive, but the effect is that the models learn to react
differently to perturbed data while still performing well on clean data, thus encouraging diversity at
their decision boundaries.
Detection. At test time, the outputs of all ensemble members are combined using a rank voting
mechanism. Each member assigns the rank 0 to the label it considers the most likely, rank 1 to the
second most likely, and so on. For each label, the ranks are summed across all members, and the
smallest label rank is used as the ensemble disagreement.
For an ensemble trained using our method, a large ensemble disagreement is indicative of an input
that lies outside of the data distribution. Correspondingly, we implement a simple rank-based crite-
rion that rejects a test example as adversarial or outlier if and only if the ensemble disagreement is
above a rank threshold hyperparameter τ . We tune τ to be as low as possible while having a low
false positive rate on clean validation data.
Classification. If an input data example is accepted by the rank thresholding mechanism, one could
simply use the label with the lowest rank sum as the overall prediction of the ensemble. However,
we find in practice that the results are improved by using a distribution summation [9] that selects
the classification label as y∗ = argmaxy
∑N
n=1 σ
y
n(x), where σ
y
n(x) is the probability of label y in
model n. In general, the mechanism for combining outputs to produce the overall prediction need
not be the same as that for detecting invalid inputs. This could be taken a step further, such that the
entire ensemble is used only for the detection of invalid inputs, whereas inputs detected as valid are
passed to a separate, perhaps more powerful classifier. We leave this idea for future investigation.
3 Experimental Results
This section answers the following questions:
1. How well does the ensemble method of Section 2 defend against known attacks? We analyze
both classification accuracy (how well the defense classifies adversarial examples) and detection
rate (how often the defense detects adversarial examples). Detection rate is a measure of the
effectiveness of the defense when used solely as a detector, assuming that the false-positive rate
is low. Classification accuracy measures how well our ensembles perform when used solely to
classify inputs. We also measure classification accuracy on accepted inputs (those not detected
as adversarial), a measure of the effectiveness of detection followed by classification.
2. To what degree is the defense susceptible to random noise? The primary metric here is rate of
false-positive detection on benign noise – how often the Section 2 detector classifies random
noise as adversarial (as this rate increases, the detector becomes less useful in deployments).
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Table 1: Accuracy, Detection rate, and mean Distortion for Clean, Noise, and Fast Gradient Sign.
Clean Noise FGS
Attack Acc. Det. Dist. Acc. Det. Dist. Acc. Det. Dist.
MNIST White-box 98.5/98.8 0.9 0 97.3/99.7 30.4 1.6 16.1/0.0 99.8 2.8
Black-box 17.5/0.0 98.9 2.8
CIFAR-10 White-box 81.6/83.9 4.6 0 76.9/83.9 39.2 0.6 10.8/13.6 99.8 1.7
Black-box 17.5/39.5 99.6 1.7
Table 2: Accuracy, Detection rate, and mean Distortion for Basic iterative, DeepFool, and C&W.
Basic iter. DeepFool C&W
Attack Acc. Det. Dist. Acc. Det. Dist. Acc. Det. Dist.
MNIST White-box 13.4/0.0 99.7 2.4 76.0/75.0 45.0 0.9 31.2/95.7 97.7 2.5
Black-box 22.5/0.1 98.9 2.4 96.7/97.6 8.2 0.8 21.3/33.0 76.0 2.4
Oblivious 81.6/82.4 3.4 2.2
CIFAR-10 White-box 8.0/2.0 48.8 1.0 37.5/38.6 42.6 0.03 7.2/6.3 68.1 2.3
Black-box 16.9/6.8 49.2 1.1 57.5/68.2 36.2 0.04 9.5/6.9 63.6 2.4
Oblivious 48.4/50.0 6.4 1.3
Threat models. We measure the effectiveness of attacks in black- and white-box modes, as well
as oblivious-mode in the case of C&W. White-box attacks have access to the model, its parameters,
and its training data. Black-box attacks have access to the model and its training data, but not
its parameters. By giving the black-box attacker access to the training data, we expect a stronger
attack than the black-box model of [1], in which the attacker and model are trained on two distinct
datasets of comparable size and quality. Performing additional experiments against weaker black-
box attackers without access to the target model’s training data is left for future work.
Attacks. The fast gradient sign method (FGS) generates adversarial examples by taking a single lin-
ear step from the original image in the direction of the gradient of the objective function. The basic
iterative method iteratively performs FGS in small steps to generate more precise examples, subject
to a box constraint on perturbation magnitude. DeepFool attempts to find a minimal adversarial per-
turbation by linearizing the discriminant function around the current perturbed example and iterating
until the current perturbation is sufficient to change the label. The C&W attack generates targeted
adversarial examples using an objective that maximizes the margin between the target class logit
and the logits of the other classes, while simultaneously minimizing the perturbation’s L2 norm.
Results from targeting Je. We first evaluate the defense against attacks which target only the Je
cross-entropy term of the objective function. In the case of DeepFool and C&W, as discriminant
function we used the sums of the unnormalized logit outputs of the ensemble members. As a by-
product of maximizing the sum of logits for a wrong label, the examples inferred by C&W are
expected to also obtain high ensemble agreement on that label. The κ parameter controlling max-
imum margin in C&W is chosen in each instance to result in comparable mean distortion across
attacks.
We fine-tune the noise hyperparameter η of the ensemble method on validation sets put aside for
both MNIST and CIFAR10, yielding η = 0.18 and η = 0.03, respectively. The selection criterion
is based on false positive rate and detection performance against a white-box FGS attack. Both
ensembles are comprised of 5members, with rank threshold τ = 2 forMNIST and τ = 5 for CIFAR-
10. For MNIST, each ensemble member is a fully connected network with a single hidden layer (128
neurons). For CIFAR-10, we use a standard convolutional network drawn from TensorFlow [3].
Tables 1 and 2 show the performance of the ensembles on unperturbed (Clean), noisy (Noise), and
adversarial inputs (FGS, Basic iterative, DeepFool, C&W), in terms of classification accuracy (Acc)
on all/accepted adversarial examples, detection rate (Det), and the mean L2 distortion (Dist) of the
adversarial examples. For the Noise column, noisy examples are generated by applying benign
random noise to the clean data set. For FGS and Basic iterative, ǫ = 0.1 and ǫ = 0.03 were used
for MNIST and CIFAR-10, respectively. Random noise examples were generated with η = 0.1
and η = 0.02, using the same algorithm that was used during training. Higher values of η cause
significant misclassification in the CIFAR-10 case, so such noise is not benign.
3
Table 3: Accuracy, Detection rate, and mean Distortion for MNIST attack on Je + λJa.
λ = 4 λ = 1 λ = 0.25
Attack Acc. Det. Dist. Acc. Det. Dist. Acc. Det. Dist.
FGS White-box 89.9/98.5 94.2 2.8 88.2/98.4 94.5 2.8 19.1/0.0 99.8 2.8
Black-box 97.0/98.8 70.8 2.8 95.2/98.9 71.2 2.8 18.3/1.7 98.8 2.8
Basic iter. White-box 96.9/97.5 56.6 1.9 45.0/91.3 89.6 2.0 15.2/3.9 99.5 2.4
Black-box 96.9/98.5 6.9 1.4 93.2/98.7 12.5 1.4 24.2/12.4 98.6 2.4
Table 4: Accuracy, Detection rate, and mean Distortion for CIFAR-10 attack on Je + λJa.
λ = 1 λ = 0.27 λ = 0.25
Attack Acc. Det. Dist. Acc. Det. Dist. Acc. Det. Dist.
FGS White-box 35.9/80.6 99.4 1.7 20.6/43.5 99.5 1.7 11.7/10.8 99.6 1.7
Black-box 33.2/74.5 99.1 1.7 20.1/46.4 99.4 1.7 18.8/37.5 99.5 1.7
Basic iter. White-box 57.0/59.4 7.9 1.0 26.4/32.2 27.1 1.0 8.9/3.3 47.2 1.0
Black-box 53.2/56.3 9.3 1.1 22.2/16.7 43.2 1.1 17.4/7.7 48.2 1.1
We see reasonable classification accuracy and false-positive rate on clean data for both ensembles.
Sensitivity to random noise is increased, but classification accuracy on accepted noisy examples is
significantly higher than usual. FGS and basic iterative are completely blocked with the exception of
the basic iterative attack on CIFAR-10, which is moderately successful. The most successful attack
is DeepFool, causing significant white-box classification error with only 42.6% detection and very
small mean distortion. However, we find that the same attack reduces the classification accuracy of
an undefended MNIST classifier to 1.32%, and CIFAR-10 to 12.02%. The oblivious C&W attack
might also be considered successful, as it achieves similar classification error with very low detection
rate, but the mean distortion is much higher. There appears to be a trade-off between classification
accuracy and detection rate. Further analysis is required to determine the cause of this trend.
The C&W attack was recently shown [1] to be quite effective at generating adversarial examples,
obtaining success rates close to 100% against ten detection methods. By setting κ = 250 in the
C&W attack, we were able to perform an oblivious attack against our ensemble method which
caused 9.6% classification accuracy and only 7.0% detection rate. However, the mean distortion
was 3.3, which we consider to be very high. intuition about the detection method, so further analysis
is required to fully understand its consequences.
Results from targeting Je + λJa. The FGS and Basic iterative attacks can be used to target Je and
Ja simultaneously, in order to both fool the ensemble and bypass the defense. Tables 3 and 4 show
results of white- and black-box attacks that target both terms of the ensemble objective function
simultaneously. Maximizing the first term causes misclassification, while maximizing the second
causes high agreement. The expectation in this case is that most members of the ensemble agree
on an incorrect label, thereby successfully causing misclassification while avoiding detection. The
scaling parameter λ can be tuned to trade off between classification accuracy and detection.
We choose values for λ that illustrate its effect on the outcome of the attacks. The terms Je and
Ja are weighted equally when λ = 1. As λ decreases, less weight is given to Ja. Again, we
observe a trade-off between classification accuracy on adversarial examples and detection. FGS is
largely ineffective, but the basic iterative method achieves greater success when λ is chosen properly,
resulting in 26.4% accuracy and only 27.1% detection in the white-box setting when λ = 0.27.
4 Conclusion and Future Work
We propose a new ensemble learning method1 for detecting adversarial examples that is both attack-
agnostic and computationally inexpensive. We evaluate its effectiveness against four known attacks
(FGS, basic iterative, DeepFool and C&W) in oblivious, black-box, and white-box settings. In future
work, we plan to incorporate adversarial re-training into our ensemble method, and to experiment
with separate models for detection and classification.
1The source code is available at https://github.com/bagnalla/ensemble_detect_adv.
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